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THE STATE OF
AMERICAN
JUVENILE
JUSTICE

t

BY MERRIL SOBIE

he year 2017 marked the golden anniversary of the
landmark In re Gault decision. (387 U.S. 1 (1967).) In
Gault, the US Supreme Court held that basic due process
rights must be afforded to children accused of committing
a “delinquent” act, the artful synonym of the word “crime” coined
by the juvenile justice movement founders. Literally overnight,
the right to counsel, effective notice, criminal law evidentiary
standards, and the right to appellate review were incorporated into
the historically informal, confidential, and largely unreviewable
juvenile justice courts.
The 50-year post-Gault era may be characterized by
three sequential chronological stages. The first, spanning
approximately 20 years, witnessed the gradual incorporation
of due process standards into an often recalcitrant juvenile
justice system. The juvenile justice judiciary also wrestled
with the difficult challenge of marrying basic Gault standards
with the underlying philosophy of a highly discretionary,
remedial, and individualized approach.
The second generational stage witnessed a virtually
unrelenting attack on the perceived softness and
ineffectiveness of the juvenile justice system. Corresponding
with a “get tough” approach to adult criminal activity, juvenile
court jurisdiction was compromised by adding “direct filing”
or the automatic transfer of serious felony cases involving
adolescents and even preadolescents to the adult criminal
system. Most states also imposed restrictions on the former
relatively discretionary and lenient juvenile court dispositional
alternatives. Although the maximum age of delinquency
jurisdiction was not formally altered, the result severely
compromised the treatment of children who had committed
any offense, from trespass to homicide.
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The current post-Gault stage commenced at the beginning of
the twenty-first century and, as of 2018, represents an ongoing
and as yet incomplete evolution to a more remedial approach.
Reversing the “get tough” generation, legislatures and courts
have been “raising the age,” thereby replacing adult prosecution
and criminal incarceration with child-oriented procedures.
Several states have also restricted or eliminated “direct file”
or transfer to the adult system, substituting exclusive juvenile
court jurisdiction. The reasons for the sharp U-turn are multiple.
Perhaps the primary cause has been the proliferation of
neurological studies proving that the human brain’s judgmental
and impulse controlling mechanisms do not mature until we
attain the relatively old age (for juvenile justice purposes) of
early to mid-20s. A dramatically falling juvenile crime rate
has further contributed to the momentum. Last, the series of
United States Supreme Court cases, citing the neurological
evidence, starting with Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005),
has highlighted the fact that children and young adults are
different and thus should qualify for less stringent sanctions.
This article will summarize the major twenty-first century
state legislative and case law developments. It will also briefly
note the expansion of state and local initiatives limiting the
prosecution of youthful offenders, such as diversion and
restorative justice programs.
RAISE THE AGE
Throughout most of the twentieth century, the 50 American
states maintained, without change, different age limitations
governing general juvenile delinquency jurisdiction. At the
end of the century, the cutoff age in three states was 16, 11
additional states limited jurisdiction to children below the
age of 17, and 36 states plus the District of Columbia and
the federal Code (governing crimes that can be prosecuted
federally) had an established “ceiling” of age 18.
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In 2007, Connecticut initiated the movement to “raise the age”
by enacting legislation granting the juvenile courts jurisdiction
to age 18, a two-year expansion. In less than one decade, every
“16-year-old” state has followed the Connecticut initiative.
(New York recently raised the age by enacting a complex
act, which is effective in 2018 and 2019.) Simultaneously,
the number of states maintaining an age 17 ceiling has
been reduced from 11 to five. In the near future, 45 of the
50 states will have adopted the national norm of age 18.
Interestingly, raise the age legislation is pending in each of
the five remaining “outliers.” We are close to achieving a
universal age.
The proliferation of raise the age states has cut across
geographic and political lines. The diversity includes Illinois,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, and Louisiana. In several states,
including Illinois, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Vermont,
bills have also been introduced to further raise the age to 20
or 21, at least for misdemeanor cases. No state has yet gone
beyond age 18, but at least a few may break the age 18 barrier
in the near future. (Meanwhile, San Francisco has established
a “Young Adult Court” in the criminal system, where youths
between the ages of 18 and 21 may be granted ameliorative
dispositions in lieu of incarceration. (Tim Requarth, A
California Court for Young Adults Calls on Science, N.Y.
Times , Apr. 17, 2017, https://tinyurl.com/ybyoo82h.)
Oddly, very little consideration or advocacy has addressed
the issue of minimum age. Most states have no minimum
threshold, permitting the prosecution of 10‑ or 11-yearold children (in 2014, 36,854 children who were below the
age of 12 were petitioned as juvenile delinquents), and at
least theoretically sanctioning the prosecution of toddlers.
(In New York, the governor’s commission on raise the age
recommended raising the minimum age from seven to 12, but
that recommendation was not approved by the legislature.)
DIRECT FILE AND TRANSFER
Juvenile court jurisdiction has never been absolute. The
early courts in most states could “transfer,” after hearing, a
case involving an older youth who had committed a specific
violent felony to the adult criminal court for adjudication
and sentencing. Until the late 1980s, transfer was a relatively
rare event. However, toward the end of the twentieth century,
state legislatures greatly expanded the number of “transfer
eligible” cases. A majority of states also enacted “direct file”
statutes, removing juvenile court jurisdiction entirely for a
large subset of felony cases. Still others granted prosecutors
the discretionary authority to file charges involving children
in the adult criminal courts.
However, in the past few years direct or automatic filing has
been reversed, frequently on a wholesale basis. For example,
in 2016, Illinois eliminated the direct or automatic transfer
of all children below the age of 16, regardless of the crime
charged, limiting the practice to juveniles ages 16 or 17 who are
charged with first-degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual
assault, or aggravated battery with a firearm. The same year,
California voters approved a proposition that repealed direct
filing completely, regardless of the youth’s age or the crime
charged. Other states that have eliminated or severely restricted

direct filing include Vermont, New Jersey, and Indiana.Recent
legislation will accordingly significantly diminish, though not
abolish, the criminal prosecution of adolescents.
CONFIDENTIALITY, SEALING, AND EXPUNGEMENT
Juvenile court records are generally confidential, with only
limited access by nonparties. A delinquency finding may
nevertheless harm the child, perhaps years or decades after
the fact. Collateral consequences may include employment
restrictions, public housing eligibility, or predicate criminal
sentencing. A youthful indiscretion may carry deleterious
ramifications well into adulthood.
For this reason, many states provide for the sealing or
expungement of records. The relevant statutes and court
rules, enacted over several decades, vary significantly, but
provide a partial albeit incomplete level of protection. In
2015, the American Bar Association (ABA) adopted a farreaching resolution recommending the expungement of most
juvenile records: the Model Act Governing the Confidentiality
and Expungement of Juvenile Delinquency Records. The
resolution has generated proposals, bills, and in a few sates
laws broadening the protection umbrella. In California, for
example, juvenile “found” delinquency records are now
sealed and the charges are dismissed when the youth has
satisfactorily completed a period of probation supervision or
a diversion program, and meets other specified criteria. (Cal.
Stats. of 2016, ch. 858 (amending Cal. W elf . & Inst. C ode
§§ 786, 827, 827.9, 828) (sealed records are nevertheless
available for very limited purposes).) Other states have
restricted or prohibited the solicitation of juvenile court
history by employers. The trend to seal or expunge has barely
commenced, but will likely expand. Further, the move to limit
or eliminate the adult prosecution of children by raising the
age and limiting direct file will, in itself, minimize collateral
harm (juvenile courts records are almost always afforded
greater confidentiality than criminal records).
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT AND ADULT PRISONS
The solitary confinement of children who have been placed
in juvenile or adult facilities represents an egregious threat
to their well-being. Isolating an adolescent in a small cell or
locked room for weeks or months should be unthinkable,
though it has been a common practice in many jurisdictions.
Contemporary neurological and psychological studies
have, in fact, proven the obvious: Solitary confinement
beyond a very brief period causes serious psychological
harm. The ABA has adopted a resolution prohibiting
the solitary confinement of persons under the age of 18
“for any reason other than as a temporary response to
behavior that threatens immediate harm to the youth or
others and ends when the threat is over and, in no case,
more than 4 hours.” In furtherance of the ABA policy, several
states and localities have prohibited or severely limited the
solitary confinement of juveniles. In other states, litigation
has succeeded in prohibiting or restricting the practice. Again,
the trend is clear.
The practice of confining children in adult jail or prisons,
a consequence of direct file or transfer, has also been limited.
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For example, New Jersey has prohibited the incarceration of
any person under the age of 18 in adult facilities. The New
York “raise the age” legislation will prohibit the incarceration
of any person under the age of 18 in Rikers Island, the
notoriously abusive New York City jail. The movement to
bar the incarceration of children in any adult facility has
gained considerable support.
OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
One reform that has virtually overnight been implemented
in several jurisdictions is the prohibition or restriction
of shackling children in court. The sordid practice,
addressed in a recent ABA resolution, appears to be
destined for oblivion. Another practice, seeking and
obtaining confessions from young children during custodial
questioning, has been reformed in Illinois and California
with the enactment of statutes mandating that children
under the age of 15 obtain the advice of legal counsel before
executing a confession during custodial interrogations.
(Ill. Pub. Act No. 099-0882 (2016).) The Illinois and
California laws may be the first measures precluding or at
least limiting the admissibility of confessions by the very
young, an age group in which confessions or admissions
have proven extraordinarily unreliable.
Last, the past few years has seen the proliferation of
diversionary and restorative justice programs. (See, e.g., H.
Ted Rubin, Moving the Money: Using Institutional Savings
to Expand Investment in Local Interventions, 23 J uv . J ust .
Update, no. 2, 2017.) The policy of diverting and treating the
nonviolent child (and in some cases the violent child) in lieu
of judicial adjudication is beneficial to both the youngster and
society. It is also far more cost-effective than the alternative
prosecution model.
OTHER NEEDED REFORMS
The progress toward a child-friendly juvenile justice
paradigm has been impressive, but at least a few
counterproductive policies remain largely untouched.
The Adam Walsh Act, which requires children who
have committed nonviolent sexual offenses to register as
sex offenders, often for life, has yet to be ameliorated.
(Nicole I. Pitman & Riya Saha Shah, Cruel and Unusual:
The Case against Registering Kids as Sex Offenders, 32
Crim. Just., no. 2, Summer 2017, at 32.) In several states,
the prosecution of the very young accused of criminal
conduct remains unabated. Last, the level of representation
afforded juveniles is inconsistent nationally, ranging from
meaningless to excellent.
CONCLUSION
The state of American juvenile justice has improved significantly
in the past several years. However, the reforms are best viewed
as a work in progress. Much has been accomplished, but much
remains to be accomplished. Crucially, after a generation of
“tough on kids” measures, we are on the road toward a true
“justice” system for children.n
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